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Abstract 
 
The G5 carry trade, where high interest rate currencies appreciate and low interest 
rate currencies depreciate, had been a persistent anomaly in financial markets since 
the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971. Conventional economics said that the reverse 
should happen: low interest rates were supposed to stimulate the domestic economy, 
leading to growth and currency appreciation, rather than fund cross-border positions 
in search of higher yields. The Global Financial Crisis resulted in a major dislocation 
of currency markets, after which the G5 carry trade reversed.  
 
This paper is an empirical study of this reversal, and the implications for 
macroeconomic theory. Using overnight and one-month carry trades as a proxy for 
market reactions to monetary policy, the period leading up to the Global Financial 
Crisis and this reversal was increasingly subdued: the so-called ‘Great Moderation’. 
Financial crises show up as outliers in the data: temporary reversals of the carry trade 
during which periods central banks provide additional liquidity in the form of lower 
interest rates. These results suggest that, prior to 2008, conventional monetary policy 
– using high/low interest rates to dampen/boost growth and inflation – was being 
counteracted by capital flows in the opposite direction, in search of high yields. Only 
since 2008, with unconventional monetary policy – QE, negative interest rates and a 
reduction in banks’ proprietary trading – have G5 currencies responded as predicted 
by conventional economics: low/high interest rates G5 currencies have 
appreciated/depreciated. The results suggest that macroeconomic theories need to be 
reconsidered, to take account of cross-border capital flows in search of yield, and the 
effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Short-term G5 interest rates have been falling consistently since the 1990s. Whilst the Global Financial 
Crisis had been preceded by a small rise in interbank rates, the lowest one month interbank rate among 
the G5 economies had fallen below 0.5% in 1996; below 0.1% in 1999; and became negative in 2012 
(Figure 1). After the Global Financial Crisis and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, central banks 
reduced their policy rates further and implemented a range of unconventional monetary policies, 
including negative rates, QE, and limits on proprietary trading. 
 
Figure 1. Lowest interbank rate among the G5 economies since July 1986 
 
 
 
 
Low interest rates are supposed to ‘stimulate economic growth’ (see Lee & Werner, 2018, p26, for a 
summary) . Similarly, during financial crises, low interest rates are consistent with the Bagehot 
principle for the central bank to lend ‘on every kind of current security, on every sort on which money 
is ordinarily and usually lent’ (Bagehot, 1873, p189). However, low interest rates also fund cross-
border positions where investors borrow low interest rate currencies to invest in high interest rate 
currencies: the ‘carry trade’. Until the Global Financial Crisis, the G5 carry trade earned investors 
around 2% p.a. with relatively low risk (Table 4). This paper investigates how the G5 carry trade 
changed after the Global Financial Crisis, in response to unconventional monetary policy, using 
simulated carry trade strategies. Secondly, by investigating differences between overnight and one-
month carry trade returns, the paper asks whether market responses can be characterised as an 
expectation that the central bank will lower rates during crisis: a liquidity put (Mehrling, 2011, p. 18). 
Lastly, this paper asks what the implications are for conventional macroeconomic theories.  
 
The approach can be applied to a wider range of currencies and durations. As such, it could be a useful 
tool to monitor the impact of unconventional monetary policies on currency markets. 
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2. Related Literature 
 
The carry trade is a persistent anomaly in exchange rate economics. According to the literature 
on market efficiency it should not be possible to forecast ‘returns with variables like dividend 
yields and interest rates’ (Fama, 1991, p. 1576). Under conventional macroeconomics, the low 
interest rate currency is supposed to appreciate and the high interest rate currency was supposed 
to depreciate, but the empirical results showed the opposite (Froot & Thaler, 1990). Amongst the 
G5 currencies, this anomaly was sufficiently robust to be described as a ‘pure source of alternative 
beta... (with)... a long-term return over 30 years that is comparable to that of global equities and 
superior to that of global bonds’ (Record PLC, 2009). FTSE, Deutsche Bank, Barclays and others 
had developed strategies to exploit this (FTSE International 2010b; S. Curcuru, Vega, & Hoek, 
2010; Melvin & Shand, 2010).  More broadly, currency markets exhibit a range of anomalies. 
Exchange rates are 30-300 times more volatile than interest rates (Gourinchas & Tornell, 2004) 
and foreign exchange volumes have grown more quickly than GDP, both of which are consistent 
with period of increased heterogeneity between investors, rather than convergence towards a 
single and efficient market (Frankel & Froot, 1990; Mark & Wu, 1998).  
 
Fama (1984) suggested that the explanation for the carry trade is a risk premium on high interest 
rate currencies: if investors perceive a high interest rate currency to be risky they go short, which 
leads to currency depreciation and for the high interest rate currency to appreciate in the future. 
However, survey data suggests that investors' ex-ante expectations are that excess returns cannot 
be earned (Cavaglia, Verschoor, & Wolff, 1994; Frankel & Chinn, 1993; Frankel & Froot, 1987). 
Rather, the carry trade is an ex post phenomenon: excess returns are unexpected (Froot & Thaler, 
1990; Sarno, Valente, & Leon, 2006). In addition, the carry trade is predominantly a short-run 
effect, and becomes weaker when long term interest rates are examined (Chinn, 2006; Mehl & 
Cappiello, 2009; but also see Bekaert & Xing, 2007).  
 
Alternatively, the carry trade is theorised as a reaction to monetary policy, which is responding 
to changes in output and inflation (Chinn & Meredith, 2004, p410). According to this theory, 
central banks adjust short term nominal rates in response to changes in inflation, a Taylor rule 
equation, resulting in short-term predictability (Molodtsova & Papell, 2009). Where there are 
limits to speculation in foreign exchange markets, small deviations would persist because the 
excess return is ‘not large enough to attract speculative capital’ (Sarno, Thornton, & Valente, 
2013, p25). However, short-term predictability does not explain why investors continued to earn 
excess returns until 2008, especially given foreign exchange turnover had continued to increase 
(BIS, 2016, p7). 
 
Alternatively, in interest rate economics, the long-term interest rate is considered a biased estimate 
of the future prevailing spot rate, because it includes a liquidity premium for long-term investors. 
Wilson (1994) summarises the relationship between short term and long term rates according to 
three phenomena: shift, twist and butterfly. Shift, which explains 80-90% of the variance in 
interest rate curves, occurs when all of the rates move in parallel; twist, which explains 5-10% of 
the variance, occurs when short and long rates move in opposite directions; and butterfly, which 
explains 1-2% of the variance, occurs when intermediate rates move in opposite directions to the 
short and long term rates. Liquidity preference theory says that this premium exists because 
investors are risk-averse, and prefer short-term maturities; preferred habitat theory says that 
investors have different time horizons; and stock-flow economics suggests the premium is simply 
a mark-up to ensure that banks make a profit after accounting for non-performing loans, deposit 
interest and expenses (Godley & Lavoie, 2007, p. 401).  
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To the author’s knowledge, no-one has investigated the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on 
the G5 carry trade, and whether or not there was a consistent mark-up or liquidity premium for 
speculating in longer duration markets. The next Sections lay out the research questions, research 
data, and methodology used to investigate these gaps. 
 
3. Research Questions 
 
i. How was the G5 carry trade affected by the Global Financial Crisis?  
ii. Is there evidence that unconventional monetary policy changed the mark-up between 
overnight and interbank carry trades? 
 
 
4. Research Data 
 
In order to simulate the carry trade for the G5 currencies, and test for the impact of monetary 
policy, overnight and one-month interest rates are used for the most actively traded currency pairs 
in 2016 (BIS, 2016, p5). Carry trades are simulated by either borrowing or investing at overnight 
policy rates (Table 1), or at one-month BBALIBOR interbank rates (Table 2). Trades are settled 
using the prevailing WM/Reuters spot rates (Table 3).  
 
Table 1: Overnight Policy Rates 
 
Currency Description Source Datastream 
JPY Basic discount rate1 Bank of Japan JPDISCR 
USD US Federal Funds target rate2  FRB of New York FRFEDFD 
GBP UK Bank of England base rate3 Bank of England UKPRATE 
CHF Swiss interbank rate4 Swiss Economic Institute SWIBKTN 
EUR Short-term Euro repo rate5 Bundesbank BDPRATE 
 
Table 2: Interbank Rates 
 Currency Description Source Datastream 
O
ne
-m
on
th
 
JPY Japanese interbank one month BBA BBJPY1M 
USD US interbank one month BBA BBUSDIM 
GBP UK interbank one month BBA BBGBP1M 
CHF Swiss interbank one month BBA BBCHF1M 
EUR Europe interbank one month BBA BBEURIM 
 
 
Table 3: Spot Rates 
Currency Description Source Datastream 
                                                        
1 The Bank of Japan conducts open market operations at the basic discount rate, such as rediscounting bills or 
extending loans to financial institutions. It is also the Bank of Japan's policy interest rate. 
2 In the United States, the main refinancing rate is the federal funds effective rate, at which depository institutions 
lend balances at the Federal Reserve to other depository institutions overnight. The daily rate is a weighted average of 
rates on trades through New York brokers. 
3 The Bank of England’s official policy rate. From 1972 - 1981 this was replaced by a minimum lending rate which 
was set in a weekly tender; from 1981 – 1986 the bank began to publish a different dealing rate for loans of different 
duration (typically one to fourteen days); and after 2006 the bank also published an official bank rate which is paid on 
reserves. 
4 There is no official overnight rate for Switzerland that covers the whole period. 
5 Prior to the launch of the Euro, this was the Bundesbank discount rate. 
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JPY Japanese Yen to Sterling spot WM/Reuters JAPAYEN 
USD US Dollar to Sterling spot WM/Reuters USDOLLR 
GBP Sterling to US Dollar spot WM/Reuters UKDOLLR 
CHF Swiss Franc to Sterling spot WM/Reuters SWISSFR 
EUR Euro to Sterling spot WM/Reuters EURSTER 
 
5. Methodology 
 
The decision whether to borrow or invest is taken according to the method employed by the FTSE 
Forward Rate Bias indices (FTSE International, 2010). Trades are placed in each of the ten 
currency pairs (CHFUSD, CHFGBP, CHFJPY, CHFEUR, USDGBP, USDJPY, USDEUR, 
GBPJPY, GBPEUR, JPYEUR) that are formed from the G5 currencies: the low interest rate 
currency is borrowed to invest in the high interest rate currency. After one month, the trade is 
settled at the prevailing spot rate.  
 
The carry trade excess return using overnight rates is: 
 
Equation 1:  𝛼" = 	𝑑𝑠(𝑚 + 1) − 	𝐼𝐷(𝑑) 
 
Where s = log of the spot exchange rate between the low and high interest rate currency; ID(d) 
= interest rate differential between high and low overnight rates at the start of the period; 𝛼" = 
monthly excess return from overnight rates 
 
The carry trade excess return using one-month interbank rates is: 
 
Equation 2:  𝛼/ = 	𝑑𝑠(𝑚 + 1) − 	𝐼𝐷(𝑚) 
 
Where s = log of the spot exchange rate between the low and high interest rate currency; ID(m) 
= interest rate differential between high and low rate interbank rates; 𝛼/ = monthly excess 
return from interbank rates 
 
In both cases, the overnight rate or interbank rate determines the borrowing currency and the 
investment currency for the next one-month period. To investigate market responses to monetary 
policy, the difference between these one-month excess returns is calculated. Liquidity preference 
theory says that a longer-term interest rate is equivalent to rolling over at the short-term rate, plus 
a constant liquidity premium: 
 
Equation 3:  1 + 𝑖/ = ∏ (1 + 𝑖")"234"25 + 	𝜋 
 
Where 𝑖/ is the monthly interest rate (interbank), 𝑖"	is the overnight central bank rate, and π 
is a constant liquidity premium for one-month  
 
Substituting Equation 3 into Equation 2: 
 
Equation 4: 𝛼/ = 	𝑑𝑠(𝑚 + 1) −	7∏ 71 + 𝑖"89 −∏ 71 + 𝑖": 9"234"25"234"25 9 − (	𝜋8 − 𝜋:) 
 
Where 𝜋8	and 𝜋: are liquidity premia for high and low interest rates respectively 
 
With overnight interest rates, the excess return after one month is: 
 
Equation 5: 𝛼" = 	𝑑𝑠(𝑚 + 1) − 	𝛽7∏ 71 + 𝑖"89 −∏ 71 + 𝑖": 9"234"25"234"25 9 
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From Equations 4 and 5, using the same currencies to estimate  𝛼/ and  𝛼", the equation 
simplifies to: 
 
Equation 6: 𝛼/ − 𝛼" =	𝜋: − 𝜋8 
 
From Equation 6, 𝛼/ − 𝛼"are a proxy for market responses to monetary policy, conventional 
and unconventional. Following Wilson (1994), if all rates shift in parallel then α= − α>  would 
be stable and zero: all part of the yield curve shift in parallel and liquidity premia are constant. If 𝜋: > 𝜋8 (α= − α> > 0) and is unstable, this is consistent with markets being dominated by a 
mark-up or liquidity premium that increases α=  temporarily. Alternatively, if  𝜋8 > 𝜋:  
(α= − α> < 0)  and is unstable, this is consistent with a negative mark-up or liquidity call than 
decreases α=  temporarily. 
 
To investigate the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the G5 carry trade and liquidity, the 
Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008 is taken as the event date. According to Melvin and Taylor 
(2009), the Lehman bankruptcy was marked by incredible levels of currency market volatility, 
with much higher spreads: between Sterling and US Dollars there was a 5500 per cent increase in 
spread volatility as the ‘pound sold off dramatically in the fall of 2008’ (Melvin & Taylor, 2009, 
p. 13).  
 
 
6. Results and Analysis 
 
The first research question, how was the G5 carry trade impacted by the Global Financial Crisis, 
is investigated using descriptive statistics, a before and after t-test, and by visualising the excess 
returns. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4 and Table 5. These include the Information 
Ratio or annualised Sharpe Ratio (Sharpe, 1994), which is the excess return per unit of risk per 
year, calculated for each return series. Unpaired t-tests are used to determine if there is a 
significant difference in excess returns before and after the Global Financial Crisis. These results 
are shown in Table 6. 
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Table 4: Excess Returns Before the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Currencies  Mean6 Information 
Ratio 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skew Kurtosis Jarques-Bera 
G5 αm 2.644% ±2.381% 0.463 19.805 -1.218 6.865 233.06*** 
αd 2.296% ±2.422% 0.395 20.137 -1.269 7.378 285.94*** 
Excluding 
USD 
αm 2.526% ±2.598% 0.405 21.575 -1.444 5.600 443.29*** 
αd 2.341% ±2.190% 0.373 21.725 -1.439 5.650 448.98** 
Excluding 
GBP 
αm 2.745% ±2.648% 0.432 22.015 -0.749 2.020 70.589*** 
αd 2.021% ±2.313% 0.305 22.948 -0.637 2.025 63.908*** 
Excluding 
JPY 
αm 2.169% ±2.262% 0.399 18.815 -0.787 2.274 85.459*** 
αd 1.975% ±1.908% 0.362 18.916 -0.833 2.479 99.639*** 
Excluding 
EUR 
αm 2.885% ±2.780% 0.432 23.120 -1.022 3.092 153.46*** 
αd 2.510% ±2.346% 0.374 23.262 -1.091 3.680 204.36*** 
Excluding 
CHF 
αm 2.880% ±2.797% 0.429 23.255 -1.292 4.414 292.14*** 
αd 2.643% ±2.343% 0.394 23.236 -1.283 4.488 298.44*** 
 
Table 4 shows that, before the Global Financial Crisis, monthly carry trades among G5 currencies 
were positive and significant at the 5% level except when JPY and USD were excluded. This is 
consistent with practitioners’ belief that JPY and USD were essential to the G5 carry trade, with JPY 
acting as a funding currency in interbank markets (Breedon, 2001, p151). Using overnight rates, this 
finding is less significant: carry trades are positive and significant at the 10% level except for the G5 
and when GBP is excluded. Information ratios vary from 0.305 to 0.465, which practitioners have 
described as a ‘pure source of alternative beta’ (Record PLC, 2009). In summary, the G5 carry trade 
is significant at the 5% level in interbank markets only, prior to the Global Financial Crisis, provided 
JPY and USD are included in the currency basket. This suggest that conventional monetary policy 
resulted in low interest rates funding cross-border positions in search of higher yields, and the high 
interest rate currency appreciated, the opposite behaviour to that predicted by conventional 
macroeconomic theory. 
 
  
                                                        
6 Annualised as monthly return x 12, showing a 95% confidence level for αm and 90% confidence interval for αd 
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Table 5: Excess Returns After the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Currencies  Mean Information 
Ratio 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skew Kurtosis Jarques-
Bera 
G5 αm -0.942% ±3.370% -0.190 17.154 -0.641 0.588 8.453* 
αd -0.290% ±2.283% -0.072 13.887 -0.354 0.341 2.627 
Excluding 
USD 
αm -1.989% ±3.808% -0.355 19.387 -0.790 0.100 14.844*** 
αd -0.470% ±2.918% -0.092 17.752 -0.799 1.363 18.757*** 
Excluding 
GBP 
αm -1.123% ±3.365% -0.277 17.131 -0.554 2.156 24.97*** 
αd -0.055% ±2.387% 0.013 14.522 -0.131 0.819 3.145 
Excluding 
JPY 
αm -0.824% ±3.622% -0.155 18.441 -0.583 0.767 8.274** 
αd 0.023% ±2.820% 0.005 17.156 0.436 0.878 6.509** 
Excluding 
EUR 
αm -0.698% ±4.564% -0.104 23.237 -1.078 3.331 66.913*** 
αd -1.506% ±3.429% -0.250 20.867 -0.976 4.880 117.4*** 
Excluding 
CHF 
αm -0.080% ±4.961% -0.011 25.258 -0.417 0.112 3.000 
αd 0.513% ±3.604% 0.081 21.927 -0.345 0.391 2.678 
 
Table 5 shows that, after the Global Financial Crisis, the G5 carry trade collapses: information 
ratios are largely negative. This is consistent with the success of unconventional monetary policy 
- QE, negative interest rates and a reduction in banks’ proprietary trading – whereby low interest 
rates stimulate the domestic economy and the low interest rate currency appreciated. These G5 
carry trade losses are negative but not significant at the 5% or 10% level.  
 
Table 6: t-Test Results 
 
Currencies  𝝈𝒑𝒓𝒆𝟐 /𝝈𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕𝟐  T-test (unpaired) 
G5 𝛼/ 0.984 Equal variance: p-value = 0.032* 
Excluding USD 𝛼/ 0.882 Equal variance: p-value = 0.018*  
Excluding GBP 𝛼/ 1.312 Equal variance: p-value = 0.030* 
Excluding JPY 𝛼/ 0.929 Equal variance: p-value = 0.089 
Excluding EUR 𝛼/ 0.826 Equal variance: p-value = 0.089 
Excluding CHF 𝛼/ 0.648** Unequal variance: p-value = 0.140 
 
Table 6 investigates whether monthly pre- and post-crisis excess returns are significantly different. 
At the 5% level, they are significantly different for the G5, as well as for currency combinations 
that exclude either the USD or GBP. At the 10% level, they are significantly different for the G5 
and all currency combinations except when CHF is excluded. Similar to Table 5, these results are 
consistent with unconventional monetary policy being more effective than conventional. 
Excluding CHF leads to volatility that is significantly higher, at the 1% level: this is consistent 
with the CHF being a ‘safe haven’ currency (Habib & Stracca, 2012, p8) after it was pegged to 
the EUR, reducing overall volatility. Excluding GBP leads to reduced volatility after the Global 
Financial Crisis, although this is not significant. 
 
Taken together, these results are consistent with the Global Financial Crisis being a major 
dislocation in currency markets, as reported by practitioners. Initially, after the Lehman 
bankruptcy, currency trading activity declined sharply, by about 30 per cent (Becker & Clifton, 
2007, p. 38). The Global Financial Crisis is described as follows: ‘it is not easy for scholars to 
appreciate fully the magnitude of the dislocations that have occurred in the FX market… fears 
were met on August 16, 2007: on this date, a major unwinding of the carry trade occurred and 
many currency market investors suffered huge losses’ (Melvin & Taylor, 2009, p. 2). Melvin and 
Taylor identified three stages during the Global Financial Crisis: an initial deleveraging as risk 
appetites fell and investors sought to reduce risk, followed by a second stage where forced sales 
by prime brokers led to increased risk aversion among investors, and lastly a flight to safety. 
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Figure 2 looks at the outliers, in terms of excess returns. Both positive and negative outliers 
correspond to financial crises accompanied by central bank intervention. For example, the 
Swedish Banking crisis had followed a period of steadily reducing interest rates in Switzerland 
and Japan until, in August 1990, US Dollar interest rates fell sharply. This was a period when, as 
a consequence of banking competition, US investment banks began to offer cheaper retail and 
commercial loans and there was the ‘de facto repeal of Glass–Steagall’ (Wolfgang H. Reinicke, 
1995, p. 114). Banking de-regulation continues with a steady reduction of interest rates in the UK, 
Switzerland and Japan, until the next outlier: the Japanese banking crisis in 1995, when Japanese 
interbank rates fell below 0.5 per cent. This liquidity put corresponded with positive excess 
returns, as did the low interest rates that followed the bursting of the dotcom bubble. In contrast, 
the Russian banking crisis of 1998 led to negative excess returns, despite Japanese interbank rates 
falling to 0.1 per cent by 1999.  
 
The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008 is the most extreme outlier. Having been 
preceded by a rise in Japanese rates (a ‘liquidity call’), the Global Financial Crisis marks a more 
permanent shift to negative excess returns and a period of unconventional monetary policy 
(Tables 4, 5 and 6): not only extensive QE, but Switzerland and Europe experimenting with 
negative policy rates, and the Swiss National Bank pledging to buy "unlimited quantities" of 
foreign currencies to prevent the Swiss Franc from rising further: the safe haven behaviour seen 
in Table 6. 
 
Figure 2. Financial Crises as Outliers 
 
 
 
In conclusion, these results show a significant reversal of the G5 carry trade after the Global 
Financial Crisis. Consistent with practitioners’ beliefs, CHF acted as a ‘safe haven’ currency after 
2008. Prior to the Global Financial Crisis, the inclusion of JPY as a funding currency, and USD 
as an investment currency, leads to higher returns (Table 4), in particular the inclusion of JPY 
(Table 6); and carry trades are more pronounced in interbank markets than in overnight markets 
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(Table 4). Only with unconventional monetary policy – extensive QE, but Switzerland and Europe 
experimenting with negative policy rates, and the Swiss National Bank pledging to buy "unlimited 
quantities" of foreign currency – have G5 currencies responded as predicted by conventional 
economics: low/high interest rates G5 currencies have appreciated/depreciated. 
 
To investigate the second research question, has unconventional monetary policy changed the 
mark-åmark-up or liquidity premium is constant and equal across all currencies, then α= − α>  
would be stable and zero: all rates would shift in parallel. If 𝜋: > 𝜋8 (α= − α> > 0) and is 
unstable, this is consistent with markets being dominated by a mark-up or liquidity premium that 
increases  α= temporarily. Alternatively, if 𝜋8 > 𝜋:	(α= − α> < 0)  and is unstable, this is 
consistent with a negative mark-up or liquidity call that decreases α= temporarily. 
 
Table 7: Differences between 𝜶𝒎 and 𝜶𝒅 Before the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Currencies  Mean IR SD Skewness Kurtosis Jarques-
Bera 
G5 αm- αd 0.009% ±0.552% 0.295 4.090 1.028 12.028 957.26*** 
Excluding USD αm- αd 0.018% ± 0.580% 0.130 4.828 1.219 12.842 1907.8*** 
Excluding GBP αm- αd 0.724% ±0.804% 0.375 6.680 1.577 10.967 1454.2*** 
Excluding JPY αm- αd 0.195% ±0.487% 0.167 4.050 0.810 16.554 3089.2*** 
Excluding EUR αm- αd 0.375% ±0.643% 0.243 5.348 0.270 7.370 609.8*** 
Excluding CHF αm- αd 0.237% ±0.633% 0.156 5.265 0.601 12.614 1792.8*** 
 
From Table 7, before the Global Financial Crisis, the positive sign and skew are consistent with 
markets being dominated by a mark-up or liquidity premium for holding longer durations. In turn, 
this is consistent with the expectation that central banks will intervene to provide liquidity during 
crises: the ‘Greenspan put’ (Nier & Merrouche, 2010, p7). There is insufficient evidence that   α= − α> >	 at the 5% level. However, when GBP is excluded, the null hypothesis can be rejected 
at the 10% level (α= − α> = 0.724%	 ± 0.673%),	which is consistent with GBP being central 
to the co-ordination of mark-ups amongst currency markets participants, given most currency 
market turnover takes place in the UK (BIS, 2016, p14). After the Global Financial Crisis,  α= −α> < 0 and Information Ratios are negative. This is consistent with market participants no longer 
expecting a mark-up or additional liquidity in response to crisis: instead, they expect 
unconventional monetary policy and the low (negative) interest rate currency to appreciate. 
However, these results are insignificant and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% or 
10% level (data not shown). 
 
Figure 3 shows how  𝛼/ − 𝛼"  varies over time. The evidence suggests that mark-ups in 
response to conventional monetary policy declines in the run up to the Global Financial Crisis, 
the so-called Great Moderation: interest rate curves are increasingly moving in parallel, known 
as shift. This is a period where FX turnover is increasing, but this increased activity does not 
result in the carry trade being arbitraged away: it is still possible to earn excess returns (also see 
Figure 2). Rather, this is consistent with herding behaviour prior to 2008, until liquidity collapses 
during the Global Financial Crisis: ‘stability is destabilizing’ (Wray, 2011, p1). 
 
After the Global Financial Crisis, α= − α> becomes less stable: this is consistent with more 
heterogeneous behaviour by market participants, following limits on proprietary trading. 
However, the post-crisis null hypothesis that  α= − α> < 0	cannot be rejected: the results are 
inconclusive that currency markets have systematically altered since 2008. Despite this, they are 
consistent with a change in market expectations due to unconventional monetary policy – ultra-
low short-term rates (Sarno et al., 2006), direct purchases of longer duration assets via 
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Quantitative Easing (QE) and, in the case of the Swiss National Bank, direct purchases of foreign 
currency – and the expectation that low interest rates currencies will appreciate. In contrast with 
the prior literature, there is no support for the G5 carry trade being more pronounced when very 
short term rates are used (Chinn, 2006; Mehl & Cappiello, 2009; but also see Bekaert & Xing, 
2007): Table 7 shows the opposite, with 𝛼/ excess returns higher than 𝛼". However, this might 
be consequence of the choice of overnight rates and the fact that trades were settled using 
overnight rates at the start of the period. 
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For market participants, there is a fully hedged carry trade strategy that was profitable before the 
Global Financial Crisis (excess return 0.724% ±0.804%, Information Ratio 0.375). The strategy 
involves trading USD, YEN, EUR and CHF only – with the inclusion of GBP, it became 
unprofitable. The fully hedged strategy is typical of a banks’ proprietary trading desk, and mixes 
maturity transformation with liquidity provision. To provide one-month liquidity, borrow the low 
interest rate currency in the one-month interbank market and lend the high interest rate currency 
in the same interbank market: this is a typical carry trade (𝛼/) and uses the low interest rate 
currency to provide liquidity in high interest rate currencies. This is hedged in overnight markets 
by lending the low interest rate currency and borrowing the high-interest rate currency at a shorter 
duration (𝛼"). The hedging strategy assumes that central banks will intervene with liquidity in 
overnight markets during financial crises. Unlike a typical carry trade, this fully hedged strategy 
has a positive skew – losses are small and frequent, whilst gains are large and infrequent – 
implying that consistent profits are only possible for insiders who can avoid the bid-ask spread. 
After the Global Financial Crisis, this fully hedged strategy breaks down.  
 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
 
The intention of this paper was to determine whether unconventional monetary policy, such as 
QE and ultra-low interest rates, resulted in a change in the way currency markets respond to 
interest rates. Prior to the Global Financial Crisis, G5 currency markets behaved in the opposite 
way to that predicted by conventional economics: the G5 carry trade, with JPY as a funding 
currency and USD as an investment currency, was significant at the 5% level (Table 4). Then, 
after the Global Financial Crisis, the carry trade reversed:  post-crisis excess returns are 
significantly different at the 5% level for the G5, and even when USD and GDP are excluded 
(Table 6). Consistent with CHF being a ‘safe haven’ currency’, volatility is higher after the Global 
Financial Crisi when CHF is excluded, most likely a consequence of CHF being pegged to the 
EUR. Overall, these results are consistent with the narrative that the Global Financial Crisis 
represented a major dislocation in G5 currency markets. 
 
Indeed, the extreme outliers in the G5 carry trade are financial crises, with the Lehman bankruptcy 
as the most significant (Figure 2). Responses to conventional monetary policy are not 
symmetrical: whilst the Russian bond default and Swedish banking crisis result in a short-term 
reversal, the Japanese banking crisis and dotcom bubble lead to positive excess returns. However, 
Figure 3 shows that the period leading up to the Global Financial Crisis was characterised by 
interest rate curves moving in parallel: the so-called Great Moderation. Then, after 2008 and the 
Lehman bankruptcy, G5 carry trade returns are consistently negative (Table 5) with increased 
volatility (Figure 3). These results suggest that unconventional monetary policy – ultra low 
interest rates and direct purchases of longer duration assets via Quantitative Easing as the ‘dealer 
of last resort’ (Mehrling, 2011) and a reduction in banks’ proprietary trading – is more effective 
at getting markets to behave as expected by conventional macroeconomics, whereby low interest 
rates stimulate the domestic economy. 
 
The findings for liquidity premia are mixed. From Table 7, there is some evidence that, pre-crisis, 
markets had come to expect central bank to lower interest rates in response to crises, increasing 𝛼/  temporarily: this is especially the case when GBP is excluded. These findings are also 
consistent with herding among market participants: with higher turnover, the carry trade is not 
arbitraged away, but volatility is reduced. Post-crisis, this market consensus breaks down: 
volatility increases and unconventional monetary policy results in low interest rate currencies 
appreciating.  
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The implication is that macroeconomic theory does not explain how currency markets respond to 
conventional monetary policy. Low interest rates led to currency depreciation, not appreciation. 
Whilst there is some evidence for a mark-up or liquidity premium, this is less evident after the 
Global Financial Crisis. Higher trading volumes do not arbitrage away the excess return; instead, 
they lead to a reduction in volatility and herding before the next crisis. Only since 2008, with 
unconventional monetary policies, have low, and negative, interest rates led to currency 
appreciation. Macroeconomic theory needs to be reconsidered to take account of the effect of 
cross-border flows in search of yield, and the beneficial effects of unconventional monetary 
policies such as QE, negative interest rates, and limits to proprietary trading.    
 
These results are sensitive to the interest rates and methodology used, and would warrant further 
investigation. There are a number of areas for further study. The tests could be repeated with 
alternative policy rates, weekly rates, 3-month rates, and longer-term rates. Spot rates to USD 
could be tested, rather than spot rates to GBP. Lastly, more currencies could be included, to 
investigate the extent to which ultra low G5 interest rates are funding broader carry trade strategies 
across emerging and developing economies. 
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